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Introduction 
Multi-dimensional panel data of survey forecasts predate econometric methodologies for 
extracting diverse macroeconomic information from these rich sources of data. The Livingston 
Survey (LS), instituted in 1946, the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), instituted in late 
1968, and the Blue Chip Economic Indicators (BCEI), instituted in August 1976, are three-
dimensional panel data sets in which multiple forecasters forecast macroeconomic variables for 
multiple target dates and at multiple forecast horizons. The SPF and the LS have longer histories 
than BCEI, though their forecast panels are anonymous and the forecasts are reported relatively 
infrequently (quarterly for SPF and semi-annually for LS). In contrast, because BCEI forecasters 
are not anonymous, researchers have suggested that these forecasters have greater incentive to 
produce accurate forecasts. Maddala (1990), Zarnowitz and Braun (1993) and Fildes and Stekler 
(2002) contain reviews of studies using these data sets. Earlier attempts to analyze these data sets 
involved testing the rational expectations hypothesis by pooling the data or collapsing one of the 
three dimensions either through elimination or aggregation. Different approaches include 
modeling only one forecaster at a time and thus reducing the data set to the two dimensions of 
targets and horizons (Batchelor and Dua 1991), modeling a single horizon thereby reducing the 
data set to the two dimensions of forecasters and targets (Swinder and Ketcher 1990; Keane and 
Runkle 1990), or by averaging individual forecasts into a single consensus forecast thereby 
reducing the dimensions to targets and horizons (De Bont and Bange 1992). Figlewski and 
Wachtel (1983) point out that collapsing the individuals dimension by aggregating forecasters 
into a consensus can mask private information and so may result in inconsistent parameter 
estimates.   3
Davies and Lahiri (1995) developed an econometric framework for analyzing multi-
dimensional panel data of forecasts. By creating a general model that described the process by 
which forecasts were generated and actuals were realized, they were able to show that forecast 
errors have two distinct components: shocks (i.e., errors that are generated external to the 
forecasters and that are, by definition, unpredictable) and idiosyncratic errors (i.e., errors that are 
generated by and specific to the individual forecasters at individual points in time). With the 
assumption of homoskedasticity, they constructed a covariance matrix of forecast errors 
involving only N+1 variance terms that would otherwise require estimation of  
(NTH)(NTH +1)/ 2 terms (number of forecasters x number of target dates x number of forecast 
horizons). The general model suggested a complex pattern to the forecast error covariance that 
was a function of the variance of news and the forecasters’ idiosyncratic variances. Davies and 
Lahiri (1999) further generalized their framework by allowing for the variance of shocks to 
change over time (i.e., conditionally heteroskedastic).  
  The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how frameworks built around multi-
dimensional panel data of forecasts can be used not only to test the rational expectations 
hypothesis correctly, but also to study alternative expectations formation mechanisms, to 
distinguish anticipated from unanticipated shocks, and to distinguish forecast uncertainty from 
disagreement.  
 
The General Case of Rational, Implicit, and Adaptive Expectations 
  Muth’s (1961) traditional rational expectations framework treats the forecast for target 
period t, Ft, as predetermined in repeated samples thereby attributing all stochastic components   4
to the process that generates the target variable at time t, At, such that (for a normally distributed 
error, ηt) 
  tt t AF     . (0.1) 
Muth’s test for rationality is actually a test for unbiasedness where the forecaster is found to be 
unbiased when α = 0 and β = 1. Nordhaus (1987) builds on Muth by defining strong efficiency as 
the state in which and all information available to the forecaster at the time the forecast was 
made is incorporated into the forecast. Combining Muth’s unbiasedness condition with 
Nordhaus’ efficiency condition gives us the modern rational expectations model 
  tt t t AF X       (0.2) 
where rationality, the combination of unbiasedness and efficiency, requires α = 0, β = 1, and 
γ = 0. The variable Xt represents information available to the forecaster at the time the forecast 
was made. Whereas Muth’s unbiasedness condition can be easily tested, Nordhaus’ efficiency 
condition can only be rejected since, strictly speaking, it requires testing all information that was 
available to the forecaster. Finding γ ≠ 0 for specific information is sufficient to reject efficiency, 
but finding γ = 0 for specific information is necessary but not sufficient to fail to reject 
efficiency. Nordhaus offers a test of weak efficiency in which the information available to the 
forecaster is replaced with the forecaster’s past forecasts. 
  What distinguishes the rational expectations model from other expectations models is that 
the forecasts errors in the former are analyzed conditional on a given set of forecasts, implying 
that the variance of the target variable exceeds the variance of the forecasts. Mill’s (1957) 
implicit expectations framework, which found many empirical applications prior to the rational 
expectations era, treats the target variable as fixed in repeated samples such that  
  tt t t FA X      (0.1)   5
where the stochastic component is attributed to the forecasts, see Lovell (1986). The implication 
here is that the variance of the forecasts exceeds the variance of the target variable.
1 Mincer’s 
(1969) adaptive expectations framework, a special case of extrapolative expectations, models the 
forecast revision at horizon h as a function of the last realized forecast error such that
2  
    ,, 1 , 1 th h th h h t t t FF A F         (0.2) 
where Ft,h is the forecast for target period t made h periods prior to the realization of the target, 
and β = 1 implies a forecast that fully incorporates information from the most recently realized 
forecast error. 
  The Davies-Lahiri framework assigns stochastic components to both the target variable 
and the forecasts. They define all shocks as unforecastable in that, by definition, shocks cannot 
be anticipated by rational forecasters. These shocks can occur at any point from a horizon h 
periods prior to the realization of the target variable at period t until the end of period t. A 
rational forecaster standing h periods prior to the end of period t would have available to him two 
types of information: the value of the target at the time the forecast is made, 
*
th A , and the 
(correctly perceived) impact of information available h periods prior to the end of period t on the 
target variable, γth. The latter can be described as a “rationally anticipated change.” Combining 
these two pieces of information yields the rational forecaster’s forecast of the actual at the end of 
period t, 
*
th th A   . When the rational forecaster is wrong, he is so because of (unforecastable) 
shocks, λth, that occurred between the time at which the forecast was made and the time at which 
the actual was realized. The actual at the end of period t can be modeled as the actual as it 
                                                 
1 It is interesting to note that the two dominant approaches to evaluate probability forecasts, viz., due to Murphy 
(1972) and Yates (1982), differ in a parallel fashion, See Murphy and Winkler (1992).  
2 See Pesaran and Weale (2006) for detailed descriptions of this class of models.   6
existed h periods prior to t plus changes rationally anticipated to occur and shocks that did occur 
over the period: 
 
*
tt h t h t h AA   . (0.3) 
Note that the shocks can take the form of changes in the actual that were not rationally 
anticipated or changes in the actual that were rationally anticipated and yet did not occur. 
 The  i
th rational forecaster standing at a horizon h periods prior to the end of period t, 
would generate a forecast, Fith, for the target variable at the end of period t. By definition, all 
rational forecasters would generate the same forecast,  th F  , where 
 
*
th th th FA    
. (0.4) 
Forecasters who are not rational will generate forecasts that deviate from  th F   due to bias, 
idiosyncratic errors, heterogeneous interpretation of public information, or private information. 
Valchev and Davies (2009) use this framework as the basis of a behavioral model describing the 
interactions of bureaucrats who can control private information and politicians who attempt to 
forecast bureaucrats’ behaviors. Lahiri and Sheng (2008, 2010b) have shown that a large part of 
disagreement among forecasters is due to the fact that they interpret public information 
differentially. Let the bias, φih, vary across individuals and horizons, and the idiosyncratic errors 
and private information, εith, vary across individuals, horizons, and target periods. The i
th 
forecaster standing at horizon h will generate a forecast Fith for the target variable at the end of 
period t where 
 
*
ith th th ih ith FA    . (0.5)   7
The framework identifies two mutually orthogonal stochastic components: λth and εith. Because 
one component is part of the process that generates the target variable while the other is part of 
the process that generates the forecast, the correct way to construct the expectations model is 
  t ith ih th ith AF      . (0.6) 
Within this framework, the traditional rational expectations model becomes a special case 
wherein εith = 0  i, t, h. Implicit expectations becomes the special case of λth = 0  t, h. 
Holding the target period constant, the adaptive expectations model becomes (where the forecast 
,, 1 ith F   is made one period prior to the forecast Fith) 
    ,, ,, 1 , , 1 it hh it hh h t it i t h FF A F       
.
 (0.7) 
Solving (0.3) for 
*
th A  , plugging the result into (0.5), then substituting the resulting right hand 
side of (0.5) for Fith in (0.7), we have: 
   
 
,, , , 1 , 1 , , 1
,1 ,1 , ,1
th th h i h i th h th th h i h i th h
h t t t i i t ith
AA
AA
   
   




It can be shown by example that λt,1 = λt+h,h+1 – λt+h,h. Combining the idiosyncratic error terms and 
ηith into ξith reduces (0.8) to 
     ,1 , 1 ,1 , 1 i h ih h i h t h h t h h ith               
.
 (0.9) 
For a forecaster who fully incorporates past forecast errors into current forecasts, βh = 1, we have 
  ,1 , 1 ih i h i i t h     . (0.10) 
Since (0.10) holds for all h and the expected value of ξith is zero, 
      ,1 EE ih i h    . (0.11)   8
This suggests that a forecaster who fully adapts under the adaptive expectations model is 
equivalent to a forecaster whose expected forecast bias increases linearly with the forecast 
horizon. For the forecaster who incorporates none of his past errors into his current forecast, 
βh = 0, we have 
  ,1 ,1 , ih i h t hh t hh i t h           . (0.12) 
The non-adaptive forecaster in the adaptive expectations model is equivalent to a forecaster 
whose bias change, ignoring the idiosyncratic error, exactly matches the shocks that occurred in 
the most recent period. In the general case of a partially adaptive forecaster, 0 < βh < 1, the 
change in the forecaster’s bias is a weighted average of the most recent shocks and the shortest-
horizon bias. 
  The Davies-Lahiri framework also suggests a test for the presence of private information. 
Under the assumption of rationality, shocks should be uncorrelated with idiosyncratic errors. The 
rational forecaster (i.e., the forecaster who is unbiased and who correctly processes all available 
information) generates forecast  th F  . Combining (0.3) and (0.4), the rational forecaster’s forecast 
error will be  
  tt ht h AF    
. (0.13) 
Compare forecaster i’s error shown in (0.6) to the rational forecaster’s error shown in (0.13). 
Suppose that forecaster i is unbiased so that φih = 0. Dropping the subscripts, the rational 
forecaster’s error variance is 
2
  , and forecaster i’s error variance is 
22
     . Suppose that 
forecaster i’s idiosyncratic error variance were correlated with the shocks such that 
 cov , th ith    . Given this correlation, forecaster i’s error variance would then be 
22 2    . Now, if 
2 /2    , then forecaster i’s error variance would be less than the   9
rational forecaster’s error variance. Given that the rational forecaster has correctly incorporated 
all publicly available information, the only way for an unbiased forecaster i to obtain a forecast 
error variance less than that of the rational forecaster is for forecaster i to have access to private 
information. 
  Clements, et al. (2007) employ this framework in testing Federal Reserve forecasts of 
inflation, real GDP growth, and unemployment for rationality. They test the Fed’s Greenbook 
forecasts for each forecast horizon separately and pooling all the horizons together. Interestingly, 
they find the forecasts to be unbiased when each horizon is tested separately, but find that the 
forecasts are biased when pooling the horizons and allowing biases to vary across horizons. They 
find that forecast revisions are correlated across horizons, implying that the Fed does not fully 
adjust its forecasts. The authors suggest an explanation that amounts to rational irrationality in 
which the Fed is motivated both to attain accuracy and to maintain the credibility. The latter can 
be called into question if the Fed reverses previous forecasts that were based on early data in 
light of data revisions. By smoothing forecast revisions, the Fed is able to avoid reversing earlier 
forecasts at the cost of only partially adjusting forecasts in light of the latest data. 
 
Measuring Shocks, Volatilities, and Anticipated Changes 
  A multi-dimensional forecast panel provides the means to distinguish between anticipated 
and unanticipated changes in the forecast target as well as volatilities associated with the 
anticipated and unanticipated changes. This is also important in determining the correct 
expression for aggregate forecast uncertainty based on such panel of forecasts. Davies (2006) 
describes three types of shocks: cumulative shocks, cross-sectional shocks, and discrete shocks. 
The shocks are distinguished by when they occur and when they impact the target being forecast.   10
Cumulative shocks, λth, are the total unanticipated changes in the actual that occur and impact the 
actual over the span starting from h periods prior to the realization of the actual. Cross-sectional 
shocks, uth, are the shocks that occur in the single period that is h periods prior to the realization 
of the actual and that impact the actual at any point up to the realization of the actual. Discrete 
shocks, vth, occur in the single period that is h periods prior to the realization of the actual and 
impact the actual in the single period at the end of which the actual is realized. These definitions 
are depicted in Figure 1 where a time line depicts quarters 4 through 10. For a forecaster 
standing at the beginning of quarter 6, the horizontal bracket labeled λ9,4 is the span of time over 
which cumulative shocks (λ9,4) can occur that will impact the realization of the forecast target, A9. 
For a forecaster standing at the beginning of period 7, the horizontal bracket labeled λ9,3 is the 
span of time over which cumulative shocks (λ9,3) can occur that will impact the realization of the 
forecast target, A9. The difference in the two, u9,4, is the set of cross-sectional shocks occurring in 
quarter 6 that impact the realization of the forecast target, A9. Notice that, there is a second 
measure of cross-sectional shocks occurring in quarter 6, u8,3. These cross-sectional shocks, 
while occurring in the same period as u9,4, impact the realization of the actual, A8. Thus, the 
difference in these two cross-sectional shocks (u9,4 – u8,3) represents information that occurs in 
quarter 6 but impacts the target in quarter 9. This difference is the set of discrete shocks, v9,4. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
  The model parameters can be estimated by assuming that the idiosyncratic errors are 
white noise over all three dimensions and that shocks are white noise over the two dimensions. 














The first difference across the horizon dimension of (0.8) is   11
  ,, 1 , 1 , 1 ,, 1 ith i t h th t h ih i h ith i t h FF               . (0.15) 
Substituting the estimates in (0.14) into equation (0.15) and averaging over i yields estimates of 
the changes in cumulative shocks over horizons where, for N forecasters, 








   

     
.
 (0.16) 
The differences in the cumulative shocks over horizons, 
  ,1 ˆˆ ˆth th t h u      (0.17) 
are the cross-sectional shocks impacting the economy over the single period beginning h periods 
prior to the end of period t. From (0.17), we estimate the discrete shocks as 
  1, 1 ˆˆˆ th th t h vuu     . (0.18) 
  Similarly, discrete anticipated changes can be derived from cumulative anticipated 
changes, γth. Taking the appropriate difference in (0.5) and we have: 
 
**
, 1 ,1 1 ,1 1 ,1 ,1 , 1 ,1 i t h it h t h t h t h t h i h ih i t h it h FF AA                 . (0.19) 
Provided that the horizon index is measured in the same units as the target index, “h periods prior 
to the end of period t” is the same point in time as “h – j periods prior to the end of period t – j.”
3 
This means that 
**
,    th t j h j A Aj   . Incorporating this into (0.19) causes the actuals to cancel and 
we have: 
  , 1, 1 1, 1 , 1 , 1, 1 ith i t h th t h ih i h ith i t h FF                . (0.20) 
Estimating the forecaster biases as in (0.14) and averaging (0.20) over i yields estimates of the 
difference in cumulative anticipated changes over horizons: 
                                                 
3 For example, while the Survey of Professional Forecasters measures both the horizon and target indices in quarters, 
the Blue Chip Economic Indicators measures the target index in years but the horizon index in months.   12








    

      (0.21) 
where the cumulative anticipated change, γth, is the sum of changes the rational forecaster 
anticipates occurring starting h periods prior to the end of period t. The first difference in the 
cumulative anticipated changes, the discrete anticipated change, 
  1, 1 ˆˆˆ th th t h a        (0.22) 
is the change in the actual anticipated, from a horizon of h periods, to occur in period t. 
  Each of the shock measures implies a corresponding volatility measure. From the 
definition for discrete shocks, we have 
   , , 1 , 1, 1 , 1, 2 , 1 , 2
1
1 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ 2
N
th ith i t h i t h i t h ih i h i h
i
vF F F F
N
     

         (0.23) 
and 
   
2
,, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 2 , 1 , 2
1
1 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ var 2
1
N
th ith i t h i t h i t h ih i h i h th
i
vF F F F v
N
     





As with the discrete shocks, we distinguish between when the volatility occurred and when the 
volatility impacted the target variable. Equation (0.24) shows the volatility of shocks that 
occurred in the single period h periods prior to the end of period t and that impact the target 
variable only in period t. Similar calculations yield the volatilities of anticipated changes, 
   
2
, 1 ,1 ,1
1
1 ˆˆ ˆ var
1
N










  In the past, researchers have used the variance of forecast errors as proxies for shocks. 
Such an approach assumes that all changes in the target variable are unanticipated. Consistent 
with approaches to modeling monetary shocks (Bernanke and Mihov, 1998, and Christiano et al., 
1997) and trade shocks (Chang and Velasco, 2001), the Davies-Lahiri framework demonstrates   13
that changes in the target variable might be either anticipated or unanticipated, and describes a 
method for separating shocks from anticipated changes. 
 
 Measuring Forecast Uncertainty 
Multi-dimensional panel data sets also provide information necessary to distinguish 
between forecast uncertainty and disagreement. Earlier research (Levi and Makin 1979; 
Bomberger and Frazer 1981; Makin 1983) used the Livingston Survey in an attempt to measure 
uncertainty about future inflation. As a proxy for uncertainty, these studies used the dispersion of 
individual forecasts for a given target. The justification for this proxy is the belief that there is a 
high correlation between the dispersion of point forecasts across individuals and the level of 
market uncertainty at the same moment in time. Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) point out that 
this proxy is not so much a measure of market uncertainty as it is a measure of disagreement 
among forecasters about expected inflation. They define the dispersion of point forecasts across 
forecasters as disagreement, and the average diffuseness of the forecasters’ probability 
distributions about their point forecasts as uncertainty.  
Using the ASA-NBER probability forecast data set, Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) 
directly compute the forecast uncertainty for each forecaster at each point in time. Let Fithp be 
individual i’s forecast for target t made at horizon h and to which the forecast assigns probability 
p. The uncertainty associated with forecaster i’s forecast for target t at horizon h, 
2
ith s  , is 




sp F F     (0.26) 
where Fith is mean of forecaster i’s probability forecasts. They define disagreement among 
forecasts for target t at horizon h, 
2












   (0.27) 
where  th F  is the mean of the individual forecasts. It is the addition of the fourth dimension to the 
data set, the probabilities, that makes the distinction between 
2
ith s   and 
2
th s  possible. They find that 
the dispersion of point forecasts and uncertainty are correlated, but that the dispersion measure 
understates true uncertainty. In a broader sense, their study is noteworthy as an example of how 
adding an additional dimension to a data set (in their case, the additional dimension was the 
probabilities associated with each forecast) allows researchers to describe phenomenon with a 
clarity impossible to achieve without the dimension. In this sense, the additional dimension 
represents not merely more data, but qualitatively different data. 
  Based on the SPF density forecasts data, Giordani and Söderlind (2003) compare 
uncertainty as estimated in (0.26) to disagreement as estimated in (0.27). They find that the two 
measures are highly correlated so that they claim that disagreement can be used as a reasonable 
proxy for uncertainty. As pointed out by Bomberger (1996) and Giordani and Söderlind (2003), 
however, disagreement remained a theoretically unfounded measure of uncertainty. 
  Lahiri and Sheng (2010a) demonstrate that the Davies-Lahiri framework suggests a 
simple way of identifying the relationship between forecast uncertainty and disagreement. It 
shows that the perceived volatility of anticipated change in the target variable mediates the direct 
relationship between the two. Following Engle (1983), we can decompose the average squared 








ti t h t t h t h
i




    
  , (0.28) 
where the observed disagreement that is observable at the time forecasts are made can be written 





























  . Taking expectations on both sides given all available information at time t-h 
including Fith and dth, we get the following conditional relationship between aggregate 




E1 . th t th th UA F d
N

   

 (0.30) 
The first term on the right-hand side of (0.30) can alternatively be written as: 
 







t th t ith t ith t jth
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       
    
. (0.31)   














    

   .
 (0.32)   















    
  .
 (0.33) 
For large values of N, the second term on the right-hand side of (0.35) will be very close to zero 
and can be ignored. Thus, the wedge between uncertainty and disagreement will be determined 
partly by the size of the forecast horizon over which the aggregate shocks accumulate – the 
longer is the forecast horizon the bigger will be the difference on average. It also suggests that 
the robustness of the relationship between the two will depend on the variability of aggregate 
shocks over time. In relatively stable time periods where the perceived variability of the 
aggregate shocks is small, whether the perceptions are correct or not, disagreement will be a 
good proxy for the unobservable aggregate uncertainty. In periods where the perceived volatility   16
of the aggregate shocks is high, disagreement can become a tenuous proxy for uncertainty. This 
finding has important implications on how to estimate forecast uncertainty in real time and how 
to construct a measure of average historical uncertainty. We address each of the implications 
below. 
  To form a measure of forecast uncertainty in real time, Lahiri and Sheng (2010a) suggest 
that one should use the observed disagreement from the survey,  th d  and the variance of 
aggregate shocks generated conditionally by a suitably specified GARCH-type model, 
2 ˆ
th    to 
estimate  th U  as 
 
2 1 ˆ ˆ 1.
th th th Ud
N
     

     (0.36) 
The justification is as follows. Uncertainty comes from two sources: the error components in 
common information and in private information. The 
2 ˆ
th    term captures the imprecision in 
common information, and  th d  reflects the imprecision in forecasters’ idiosyncratic information 
and diversity in forecasting models. The measure of uncertainty in (0.36) avoids the drawback of 
the inability to capture the heterogeneity of forecasting models in using GARCH measure of 
uncertainty alone. Their suggestion is supported by the findings in Batchelor and Dua (1993) and 
Bomberger (1996); in a comparison of ARCH and survey measures of uncertainty, these two 
studies concluded that the former tends to be lower than the latter, and more importantly the 
former is less variable over time than the latter. Thus, if one accepts survey measures as valid, 
the ARCH measure alone underestimates the level and the variation in uncertainty over time. 
Using the SPF density forecasts, Lahiri and Sheng (2010a) find that, compared to the uncertainty 
constructed using the squared error in the mean forecast, the uncertainty measure in (0.36) is less 
volatile and matches better the survey measure of uncertainty. This underscores the important   17
point that ex ante uncertainty has to be generated conditionally based on the information known 
to survey respondents when making their forecasts, which is exactly what GARCH-type models 
do. 
  Since November 2007, the Federal Open Market Committee has released a summary of 
participants’ views about how the current level of uncertainty compares with that seen on 
average in the past. This calls for the construction of an appropriate historical benchmark 
uncertainty. Using squared forecast errors of a number of private and government forecasters 
averaged over 1986-2006, Reifschneider and Tulip (2007) proposed such a measure of past 
forecast uncertainty. They first calculated the individual root mean squared error (RMSE) over 

















.     (0.37) 
Note that the above measure is different from the one suggested in Lahiri and Sheng (2010a). 

















     (0.38) 
to estimate the typical uncertainty of a randomly drawn forecaster from the sample. It is clear 
that the Reifschneider-Tulip measure in (0.37), like Lahiri-Sheng measure in (0.38), will have 
the disagreement and the squared consensus forecast error as components of uncertainty. Also, 
because of the averaging of squared mean forecast errors over the last twenty years, the 
Reifschneider-Tulip measure may not be very sensitive to occasional large forecast errors, and 





RT RMSE RMSE  , where the equality takes place when there is no individual   18
heterogeneity with respect to idiosyncratic error variance, that is, 
2 2
    
i  for all i. This 
hypothesis has been overwhelmingly rejected in the studies of inflation forecasts, cf. Davies and 
Lahiri (1999) and Boero, et al. (2008). Thus, the uncertainty measure constructed according to 
(0.37) will necessarily underestimate the “true” ex post uncertainty. 
 
Rationality Tests 
  We have shown that with a multi-dimensional forecast panel it is possible to extract 
estimates of shocks, anticipated changes, and volatilities. These estimates can be analyzed 
directly or used in constructing error covariance matrices for use in conducting rationality tests. 
Bonham and Cohen (2001) show that forecast rationality tests of panel data will falsely 
accept unbiasedness when microhomogeneity does not hold. That is, when regression 
coefficients are not constant across forecasters, it is possible for individual biases to cancel each 
other out leaving a panel that appears unbiased in the aggregate despite being biased in the 
individual. The authors show that microhomogeneity does not hold for the majority of SPF 
forecasts and so conclude that tests for unbiasedness should only be carried out for the 
forecasters individually or for the panel of forecasters using seemingly unrelated regression. 
There is no reason to assume that, similarly, microhomogeneity holds for other panel data sets of 
survey forecasts. Therefore, Bonham and Cohen’s results underline the need to avoid both 
collapsing the individuals dimension by using consensus forecasts, and constraining regression 
parameters to be constant across individuals in panel data sets. 
Keane and Runkle’s (1990) attempt to analyze the SPF data set is noteworthy for their 
use of generalized method of moments. Using SPF data, they estimate the rational expectations 
model:   19
  ti t i t i t AF X       (0.39) 
where the i
th individual’s forecast for the target date t is Fit, and the actual at time t is At. Xit is 
information available to forecaster i at the time he made his forecast, and εit is noise. Under the 
rational expectations hypothesis, the forecasts are unbiased (i.e., α = 0, β = 1) and efficient (i.e., 
γ = 0). To reduce the three-dimensional SPF data set to two-dimensions, Keane and Runkle used 
only the single forecast horizon that was closest to the realization of the actual. 
  In a departure from forecast rationality research up to that time, Keane and Runkle 
claimed to have found no evidence of irrationality, but their results are suspect for several 
reasons in addition to their choice to evaluate only the nearest forecast horizon. Bonham and 
Cohen (1995) point out that the results of their analysis are invalid due to unaddressed non-
stationarity. Further, since information available to the forecaster, Xit, is predetermined but not 
strictly exogenous, a GMM (or GLS) estimation of (0.39) yields inconsistent parameter estimates 
when there are individual specific dummy variables on the right hand side because the regression 
becomes equivalent to a regression on demeaned variables. The demeaned  i X  are functions of 
future values of Xit and the demeaned errors likewise are functions of future errors. Because past 
innovations can affect future information, the error and the regressor in the demeaned regression 
will be contemporaneously correlated. Keane and Runkle attempt to sidestep this problem by 
assuming a common bias for all forecasters thereby avoiding the use of individual-specific 
dummies. However, including a constant term causes the same cotemporaneous correlation 
between the error and the regressor as does including individual specific dummies, therefore 
Keane and Runkle’s model suffers from the very problem they attempt to avoid. In addition, the 
assumption of a common bias can mask individual forecaster biases. If some forecasters exhibit 
positive biases while others exhibit negative biases, assuming a common bias can cause the   20
forecasters to appear to be unbiased in the aggregate despite the fact that they are biased in the 
individual.  
Although they did not analyze their data in three-dimensions, Keane and Runkle did 
describe a rudimentary error covariance matrix for a three-dimensional analysis. Lacking an 
underlying model describing how the actuals and forecasts are generated and how the effects of 
shocks accumulate over horizons, their error covariance matrix was neither complete nor reduced 
to the minimal number of parameters. However, it did provide the first glimpse into the 
complexity of forecast evaluation in multi-dimensional data. 
Given that stochastic components appear in both the actual and the forecasts, the correct 
formulation for a rationality test is 
  t ith ih th ith AF       (0.40) 
where the φih are fixed effects to be tested, and the λth and εith are components of the error term. 
From the definition of λth in (0.18), the assumption that cross-sectional shocks are independent 
over both dimensions, and that the idiosyncratic shocks are independent over all three 
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i    is the variance of the idiosyncratic error for forecaster i, and I is a TH x TH identity 
matrix. The matrix Ai contains the covariance of error terms across targets and horizons for 
forecaster i, and the matrix B contains the covariance of error terms across targets and horizons 
and any two forecasters. Matrix B is comprised of component matrices, 
12 ,
j
tt b , where each H x H   21
component matrix represents the error covariance for different forecasters, across targets t1 and t2 
(where j = |t1 – t2|), and across the horizons. 
 
01 2 3 1
1 1,2 1,3 1,4 1,
10 1 2 1
1,2 2 2,3 2,4 2,
21 0 1 1
1,3 2,3 3 3,4 3,
3' 2 1 0 1
1,4 2,4 3,4 4 4,
1' 1' 1' 1' 0









































The pattern in the elements of 
12 ,
j
tt b  is determined by the forecast panel being analyzed. For the 
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) data set (Figure 2), in each quarter, individuals 
generate forecasts for the last quarter, the current quarter, and each of the next four quarters.
4 For 
the Blue Chip Economic Indicators (BCEI) data set (Figure 3), in each month, individuals 
generate forecasts for the current year and the next year. In both figures, the arrows indicate the 
points in time at which the indicated forecasts are made. The horizontal brackets show the ranges 
of time over which cumulative shocks occur that affect the various forecasts. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
[Insert Figure 3] 
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      
  .
 (0.44) 
For the BCEI panel, we have: 
                                                 
4 See Lahiri and Liu (2005, 2006) for the detailed analysis of the SPF density forecast data.   22
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       
  .
 (0.46) 
Holding the target period constant, as the horizon increases, the variances of the cross-
sectional shocks accumulate. We can use this fact to construct the H x H covariance matrix of 
forecast errors for different forecasters, the same target and across the horizons. Let m be the 
shortest forecast horizon and M be the longest forecast horizon such that M – m + 1 = H. For 
example, for the SPF m = –1 and M = 4; for the BCEI, m = 1 and M = 24. For both the SPF and 
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The covariance of forecast errors can be different depending on the panel, and are 
determined by examining the structure of the forecasts as shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3. 
Based on the structure of the BCEI forecast panel, we know that forecast errors will be correlated 
(depending on the forecast horizons) for targets separated by up to two periods.
5 For the BCEI 
panel, we have the following H x H covariance matrix describing the covariance of forecast 
errors for different forecasters, across adjacent target periods, and across the horizons: 
                                                 







12 11 10 1
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12 11 10 1
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   (0.48) 
For the BCEI panel, there is no error covariance (under rationality) when targets are separated by 
more than one period. Therefore, 
12 ,  1
j
tt j   b0 . 
Based on the structure of the SPF forecast panel, we know that forecast errors will be 
correlated (depending on the forecast horizons) for targets separated by up to five quarters. 
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b  (0.53) 
By making use of the structure of the forecast panel, the NTH x NTH error covariance 
matrix in (0.41) can be constructed from N + TH parameter estimates. These covariance matrices 
then can be used to test rationality in a Generalized Method of Moments framework.  
 
Conclusion 
  Now there exist a number of very rich panel data sets that record forecasts made by 
professional forecasters collected at alternative frequencies, for multiple horizons, and with   26
rolling and fixed targets. The forecasts are typically for a wide array of macroeconomic and 
financial variables. For example, in the U.S. the Livingston data have been available since 1946, 
SPF data since 1968 and the Blue Chip surveys since 1976. The European Central Bank is 
conducting a SPF-type survey since early 1990s. More interestingly, Consensus Economics Inc. 
has been collecting macroeconomic forecasts on a large number of countries since October 
1989.
6 With the proliferation of quality multi-dimensional surveys, it becomes increasingly 
important for researchers to employ an econometric framework in which these data can be 
properly analyzed and put to their maximum use.  
In this chapter we have summarized such a framework developed in Davies and Lahiri 
(1995, 1999), and illustrated some of the uses of these multi-dimensional panel data. In 
particular, we have characterized the adaptive expectations mechanism in the context of broader 
rational and implicit expectations hypotheses, and suggested ways of testing one hypothesis over 
the others. We find that, under the adaptive expectations model, a forecaster who fully adapts to 
new information is equivalent to a forecaster whose forecast bias increases linearly with the 
forecast horizon. A multi-dimensional forecast panel also provides the means to distinguish 
between anticipated and unanticipated changes in the forecast target as well as volatilities 
associated with the anticipated and unanticipated changes. We show that a proper identification 
of anticipated changes and their perceived volatilities are critical to the correct understanding and 
estimation of forecast uncertainty. In the absence of such rich forecast data, researchers have 
typically used the variance of forecast errors as proxies for shocks. It is the perceived volatility 
of the anticipated change and not the (subsequently-observed) volatility of the target variable or 
the unanticipated change that should condition forecast uncertainty. This is because forecast 
uncertainty is formed when a forecast is made, and hence anything that was unknown to the 
                                                 
6 See Isiklar et al. (2006) for an extension of the Davies-Lahiri framework to a multi-country context.    27
forecaster when the forecast was made should not be a factor in determining forecast uncertainty. 
This finding has important implications on how to estimate forecast uncertainty in real time and 
how to construct a measure of average historical uncertainty, cf. Lahiri and Sheng (2010a). 
Finally, we show how the Rational Expectations hypothesis should be tested by constructing an 
appropriate variance-covariance matrix of the forecast errors when a specific type of multi-
dimensional panel data is available.  
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Figure 1. Definitions of Shocks 




Figure 2. Structure of the Survey of Professional Forecasters Panel   33
 
 
Figure 3. Structure of the Blue Chip Economic Indicators Panel 
 